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This paper investigates a theoretical and empirical model to provide
a new insight into the relationship between R&D subsidies and ﬁrm-
level productivity. The empirical analysis evaluates the productivity
of ﬁrms involved in a European programme of public R&D subsidies
called Eureka. The ﬁndings suggest that the Eureka ﬁrms experience
on average productivity gains towards the end of the four-year subsidy
period. However, the average increase in productivity hides substan-
tial ﬁrm heterogeneity. Namely, lowly productive ﬁrms gain more from
the Eureka R&D subsidies than highly productive ﬁrms. The empir-
ical analysis is conducted across industries by using propensity score
matching and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation method. The the-
oretical model explores the linkage between an R&D subsidy and the
speed at which a subsidized ﬁrm adopts a new technology. It is shown
that such a ﬁrm adopts the new technology faster. This is due to R&D
subsidy decreases the ﬁxed cost of adopting the new technology. But
it is also due to R&D spillovers which decrease the marginal cost of
production. Furthermore, the lowly productive ﬁrm characterized by
a high marginal cost adopts the new technology faster than a highly
productive ﬁrm.
Keywords: R&D subsidies, Research Joint Venture, Total Factors Produc-
tivity and Firm Heterogeneity.
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11 Introduction
Public R&D subsidies are commonly implemented to stimulate innovations
and economic growth. R&D subsidies are justiﬁed for two main reasons. The
ﬁrst is because ﬁrms face important R&D expenditure constraints and the
second is due to R&D spillover eﬀects. Indeed, knowledge is a public good
whose social returns are higher than private returns. The R&D activities of
a ﬁrm generate spillovers which aﬀect positively the activities of others ﬁrms
without payment (Jaﬀe, 1986). The ﬁrms beneﬁting from R&D spillovers
tend to invest less in R&D (Leahy & Neary, 1997). Therefore, subsidies can
be an important tool to make these ﬁrms invest in more R&D.
The eﬃciency of R&D subsidies is debatable. In particular, some argue
that given the fact that authorities do not have the ability to identify ﬁrms
that need R&D subsidies, ﬁrms develop an opportunistic behavior. Namely it
can be that ﬁrms who could undertake R&D by themselves ask for subsidies,
and therefore their private R&D expenditures are fully "crowded out" by
public subsidies. This "crowding-out eﬀect" decreases the eﬃciency of the
R&D subsidies. The eﬃciency of R&D subsidies is also debatable because
it might be that the inﬂuence of pressure groups aﬀects the selection of the
subsidized ﬁrms (Baldwin & Robert-Nicoud, 2007). Moreover, other add
that the choice of subsidized ﬁrms depends on political ambitions of the
government. It is likely that the government selects the subsidized ﬁrms
more on the basis of their constituency rather than on the quality of the
project (Wallsten, 2000).
This paper aims at ﬁlling the gap in what is presently known about the
link between R&D subsidies and ﬁrm performance. Previous literature has
mainly studied the average eﬀect of R&D subsidies on ﬁrm performance.
Nevertheless, the eﬀect of subsidies on heterogeneous ﬁrms has never been
investigated. Firm heterogeneity has been pointed out in the trade literature
as being a key issue to better understand ﬁrm performance and structure
(Bernard & Jensen, 1995). The main contribution of this paper is thus to
propose both a theoretical and empirical model to investigate the eﬀect of
R&D subsidies on namely the productivity of heterogeneous ﬁrms.
Theoretically, we develop a model that extends the model of Miyagiwa
and Ohno (1995) to examine whether a subsidy for collaborative R&D in-
creases the proﬁt gain that a "laggard ﬁrm" gets from innovation. Such a
subsidy decreases the innovation cost and creates spillovers. It is found that
the "laggard ﬁrm" speeds up technology adoption and becomes more pro-
ductive. Considering ﬁrm heterogeneity (Konings & Vandenbussche, 2007),
the model predicts that a subsidized ﬁrm adopts the new technology faster
2if it is lowly productive than if it were highly productive.
We also develop an empirical model that lends support to the theory.
In the model, we evaluates the Eureka program, a European programme
of public subsidies for collaborative R&D. We investigate the role of R&D
subsidies on productivity. We also explore the role of subsidies on other ﬁrm
performance measures like employment, capital and R&D expenditures. The
Eureka programme subsidizes mainly ﬁrms, research centers and universities
in 38 countries. Although various EU members are involved in the Eureka
program, we focus on France.1 Since the creation of Eureka 26 years ago,
France has invested around 5 billions in the programme.
Our empirical results suggest that at the end of the four-year Eureka
research, subsidized ﬁrms show on average a higher Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) relative to the control group. As it will be explained later, our control
group consists of ﬁrms that have the same characteristics but do not receive
any funding from Eureka. Our results also suggest that ﬁrm heterogeneity
is a key feature. Less eﬃcient ﬁrms experience higher TFP improvements.
On the other hand, ﬁrms that are close to the technological frontier become
relatively less productive compared to the control group. Moreover, our
results suggest that the average subsidized ﬁrm has a disadvantage in wage
growth rate relative to the control group. Little evidence is found however on
the relationship that could exist between R&D subsidies and employment,
capital, R&D expenditures and credit constraints.
As mentioned above, the paper mainly contributes by addressing het-
erogeneity across subsidized ﬁrms. The paper also diﬀers from the previous
literature on public expenditures in at least two other ways. First, we con-
trol for two types of endogeneity. On one hand, it is likely that the ﬁrms
conducting R&D have a higher likelihood to be selected. We account for this
endogeneity by performing propensity score matching. We also correct au-
tocorrelation in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) model on panel data.2 On
the other hand, the selection of subsidized ﬁrms can be endogenous because
the selection might be linked to national rules. Indeed, national authorities
select the Eureka ﬁrms in speciﬁc areas and industries, so we have to set ad-
ditional requirements on matching to control for the location and industry.
1For example in 2006, France ﬁnanced 11% (2,667 millions) of all R&D expenditures
carried out by French ﬁrms. The French gross domestic R&D expenditures is worth
37.9 billions in 2006 of which 25% are ﬁnanced by the government. See the National
proﬁle of France (section Research Funding System) on the European Commission website:
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch.
2See Baltagi and Wu (1999), Martin et al. (2008) and Konings and Vandenbussche
(2008)
3This treatment will decrease endogeneity and increase the eﬃciency of our
matching. Second, the Eureka programme has received little attention until
now due to a lack of data. This paper is one of the ﬁrst to investigate the
eﬀect of the Eureka R&D subsidies on ﬁrm productivity.3 We work with a
unique database provided by Eureka on French ﬁrms joining its programme.
Other ﬁrm data such as added value, exports and R&D expenditures were
obtained using the Amadeus database on the ﬁrms’ balance sheets.4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
model on the R&D subsidies and the speed of the technology adoption. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the Eureka programme and its design. Section 4 describes
the data and explains the empirical methodology. Section 5 explores the
characteristics of the subsidized ﬁrms. Section 6 provides the results and
robustness checks regarding the relationship between the Eureka R&D sub-
sidies and the performance of the French ﬁrms. In sections 7 and 8, we open
a discussion about our results and we draw conclusions from the study.
2 Theoretical motivation: R&D subsidies and speed
of technology adoption
Our theoretical model gives a motivation for the subsidized R&D conducted
within a research joint venture. Two cases are studied. The ﬁrst case focuses
on the spillovers coming from the collaboration whereas the second case
focuses on the R&D subsidy, i.e. the subsidy that decreases the ﬁxed cost
of the technology adoption. In both cases, it is found that the optimal
timing of the technology adoption speeds up because the ﬁrm decreasing its
marginal costs becomes more productive. It is straightforward to see that
the combination of both cases, i.e a subsidy for collaborative R&D, speeds up
more the optimal timing even more. It is also found that ﬁrm heterogeneity
matters.
There are two ﬁrms in the theoretical setting: one eﬃcient ﬁrm and a
"laggard ﬁrm" which attempts to narrow the technology gap. Assume a
dynamic Cournot duopoly over a continuous time t with t ∈ [0;∞). In the
dynamic Cournot game, a "laggard ﬁrm" competes with an eﬃcient ﬁrm who
has already adopted the latest technology available at t = 0. A university
is added to the model. In order to narrow the technology gap, the "laggard
ﬁrm" forms a research joint venture with this university or it asks for a R&D
3See also Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002).
4We focus on France due to the good quality of the Amadeus. For France, Amadeus is
a census. It is not the case for the other EU countries.
4subsidy.
The parameter θ describing the technology eﬃciency is continuous: θ ∈
[0;∞). The two ﬁrms diverge in terms of marginal costs of production. The
eﬃcient ﬁrm has marginal costs of production equal to 0. The other ﬁrm is
technologically lagged and operates at higher marginal costs of production
given by c¯ θ, where c¯ θ > 0.
The adoption of the new technology is modeled by a reduction in the
marginal costs. Here, we consider that this reduction in the marginal costs
always corresponds to an increase in productivity. After the adoption of the
new technology, the "laggard ﬁrm" operates at lower marginal costs denoted
cθ and becomes more productive. The adoption of the new technology by
the "laggard ﬁrm" at time t comes at a one-time ﬁxed cost denoted k(t). It
is assumed that the ﬁxed cost of the technology adoption declines over time
because of ongoing R&D activity, i.e. k
0
(t) < 0. It is also assumed that the
rate of decline slows down over time, i.e. k
00
(t) > 0. Furthermore, there is no
uncertainty concerning the outcome of the R&D that cannot be unsuccessful.
2.1 Case one: R&D collaboration
In this ﬁrst case, the "laggard ﬁrm" decides to form a research joint venture
with a university in order to beneﬁt from its knowledge throughout R&D
spillovers. It is shown that spillovers ﬂowing from the university to the "lag-
gard ﬁrm" decrease directly its marginal costs (d’Aspremont & Jacquemin,
1988). Assume that the collaborative R&D is conducted from t = 0 through
the adoption of the new technology at time t∗. The "laggard ﬁrm" ﬁnds the
optimal timing of the technology adoption t∗ balancing the innovation costs







e−rtπdt − e−rtk(t) (1)
where r is the given interest rate, π and ¯ π are the proﬁt before and
after the technology adoption. Hence, the two integrals are the discounted
present sums of proﬁt before and after adoption. The last term represents
the discounted present value of the new technology ﬁxed cost.
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal date of innovation t∗ when
the ﬁrm forms a research joint venture is given by the following ﬁrst order
condition:
5rk(t) − k0(t) = π(cθ) − π(c¯ θ) (2)
This equilibrium condition (equation (2)) as well as the intertemporal
proﬁt of the ﬁrm (equation (1)) are derived by Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995).
Equation (2) shows that at the optimal time t∗ the marginal cost of adopting
the new technology is equal to the beneﬁt of the new technology. The left-
hand side gives the marginal cost of the technology adoption. By waiting one
additional period, the ﬁrm can invest elsewhere k(t) on the market and earns
rk(t). In addition, postponing adoption lowers the adoption costs by −k0(t).
The right-hand side represents the value of technology, i.e. the proﬁt gain of
adopting the technology at time t.5 Two corner solutions can emerge. First,
the "laggard ﬁrm" can master immediately the new technology if its beneﬁt
is larger than its marginal cost. Next, if the beneﬁt is less than its marginal
cost for all periods t, the "laggard ﬁrm" never adopts the new technology
(Boucekkine et al.; 2004).
The proﬁt gain of the "laggard ﬁrm" is larger if it forms a research joint
venture as shown in the following equation:
π(cθ) − π(c¯ θ) < π(cθ − δ) − ¯ π(cθ) (3)
where δ denotes the decrease in the ﬁrm’s marginal costs attributed to the
R&D spillovers. The right-hand side and the left-hand side give respectively
the proﬁt gain with and without the R&D spillovers. The gain is larger
with the R&D spillovers because the decrease in the initial marginal costs
cθ is more important. The technology ﬁnanced by the ﬁrm’s private R&D
expenditures decreases c¯ θ that becomes cθ. Furthermore, the research joint
venture creates R&D spillovers that decrease the marginal costs by −δ.
Figure 1 depicts the proﬁt gain associated with the R&D spillovers. The
horizontal line representing the time-invariant value of technology (proﬁt
gain) moves up. The downward sloped marginal cost of the new technology
is unchanged. The initial optimal timing of adopting t1 decreases and be-
comes t2.
[Figure 1 about here]
2.2 Case two: R&D subsidy
In the second case, the "laggard ﬁrm" gets an R&D subsidy. Here, an R&D
subsidy rate s is set in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt equation as well as in the ﬁrst order
5Assuming that k
0(t) < 0 and k
00(t) > 0 guaranties a maximization of the proﬁt.







e−rtπdt − e−rt(1 − s)k(t) (4)
The last term is the discounted present value of the new technology’s net
ﬁxed cost. The optimal switching time t∗ is derived from the following ﬁrst
order condition:
r(1 − s)k(t) − k0(t) = π(cθ) − π(c¯ θ) (5)
Figure 2 depicts the above ﬁrst order conditions. Comparing equations
(2) and (5), we see that the R&D subsidy speeds up the technology adoption
since there is a shift to the left of the curve representing the marginal costs
of the new technology. The horizontal line representing the time-invariant
value of technology (proﬁt gain) remains unchanged. The initial optimal
timing of adopting t1 decreases and becomes t2. It is simple to show that
a subsidy for collaborative R&D speeds up more the optimal timing than a
single research joint venture or R&D subsidy does.
[Figure 2 about here]
2.3 Heterogeneity in marginal costs
Here, we allow ﬁrm heterogeneity in marginal costs (Konings and Vanden-
bussche (2007)). In particular, the "laggard ﬁrm" can have high or low
marginal costs and we assume the marginal costs is a continuous variable.
From our empirical results, we consider that the subsidised innovation has
a heterogeneous impact on marginal costs since a "laggard ﬁrm" has more
space to innovate. Hence, in both studied cases, a "laggard ﬁrm" narrows the
technology gap faster. Its proﬁt gain after the switch to the new technology
is higher than if it has low costs:
∂(π(c¯ θ) − π(cθ))
∂cθ
> 0
Using the assumption on the heterogeneity in costs, in both cases it is
straightforward to show graphically the heterogeneous impact on the proﬁt
gain as depicted Figures 3 − 4. The "laggard ﬁrm" adopts earlier the new
technology if it has high costs than if it has low costs. After the innovation,
the timing moves from t∗
1 to t∗
3 if the ﬁrm has high costs. It moves from t∗
1
to t∗
2 if the ﬁrm has low costs.
7The theoretical model allowing heterogeneity can also be applied to a
setting without collaboration and R&D subsidy. In this setting, the eﬃcient
ﬁrm still adopts the latest technology at time t∗ = 0. The "laggard ﬁrm"
adopts at time t∗ ∈ [0,+∞). Figure 4 shows, for instance, that a ﬁrm with
high costs gets a larger proﬁt gain after the switch to the new technology.
The initial optimal timing t∗
1 becomes t∗
4. If the "laggard ﬁrm" has low costs,
its new optimal timing is located between t∗
1 and t∗
4.
[Figure 3 − 4 about here]
In the theoretical model on the technology adoption of a "laggard ﬁrm", a
R&D collaboration as well as a R&D subsidy speed up the technology adop-
tion and allow the ﬁrm to operate with lower marginal costs. Considering
ﬁrm heterogeneity in marginal costs, the results suggest that the "laggard
ﬁrm" can narrow the technology gap faster if it has high costs. The model
provides a theoretical motivation for R&D subsidies and then for the design
of the Eureka program. However, such a programme for commercial R&D
can be less proﬁtable for the society if the projects associated with expected
high private proﬁts are subsidized. This issue is discussed it the following
part.
3 The Eureka programme
3.1 A programme for collaborative R&D
The Eureka programme was launched in 1985 as a tool of European innova-
tion policy, including the EU Framework Programmes for research and tech-
nological development. These programmes focus on fundamental research.
Designed to develop research on process and product innovation, Eureka is
an R&D subsidy programme that involves 38 countries, mainly EU members.
Each Eureka collaborative research includes research partners from at least
two countries. The Eureka subsidised research partners are mainly ﬁrms,
research centres and universities. Between 1985 and 2004, 8,520 research
partners were involved in the Eureka programme.6 This Eureka network
includes 4,698 European ﬁrms and 1,937 other European partners. The
ﬁnancial health of ﬁrm is a key criterion in the allocation of Eureka’s sub-
sidies. The Eureka agencies target growing ﬁrms with good expectations of
6The information on the number of Eureka partners comes from the Eureka website
(www.eureka.be).
8survival. Firms that request subsidies but do not get them are generally in
decline. We call these latter ﬁrms in termination cases. The programme
supports mainly manufacturing but research in agriculture and services are
also funded. In table 1, we see that Eureka in France covers one third of the
99 NACE 7 two-digit industries.
[Table 1 about here]
The organisation of Eureka is decentralised. The allocation of funds takes
place at the country level, not at the European level. In other words, the
providers of public subsidies are the national authorities. Every year, each
Eureka country chooses the level of public funds to be devoted to Eureka.
The duration of the Eureka subsidy varies between 1 and 8 years, run-
ning, on average, for about 3 and a half years. The Eureka agencies analyse
the progress of the collaborative research for monitoring purposes. The Eu-
reka subsidy is a partial support that can reach 50% of the ﬁrm’s R&D
expenditures. It can take the form of an interest-free loan. The loan does
not have to be repaid if the collaborative research fails. However, this Eureka
rule does not apply to French partners.
3.2 Accurate evaluation8
Although many governments implement R&D programmes around the world,
the design of public R&D subsidies for process and product innovations raises
a political debate. This is mainly because these commercial programmes are
not protected against moral hazard. Since public subsidies provide a less
expensive source of capital than any other, there are two sets of recipients
of R&D subsidies: ﬁrms able to support research without the subsidies; and
ﬁrms not eligible for capital from other investors, i.e. ﬁrms that could not
undertake research without public funds.
The controversy is linked to the fact that the providers of public subsidies
are unlikely to be able to disentangle the two sets of ﬁrms requesting R&D
subsidies. Therefore, they are unable to protect themselves against potential
opportunistic behaviour.
Wallsten (2000) argues that the public agencies should not fund ﬁrms on a
criterion of commercial expectations. It is misleading because the R&D pro-
posals with the greater commercial expectations present high private returns
7NACE is a classi?cation of economic activities in Europe. The NACE classiﬁcation is
available from the EUROSTAT website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon.
8Wallsten (2000) is the main source of this subsection.
9and would be pursued anyway. Instead, the government agencies should se-
lect the best proposals associated with a good level of social returns and not
proﬁtable on a private basis. Given the nature of the latter proposals, public
subsidies are the only source of research ﬁnancing for them. With govern-
mental support, these socially proﬁtable projects can also become proﬁtable
from a private point of view.
The allocation of R&D subsidies could be based on the expected social
returns rather than on the expected private ones. However, estimation of the
expected social returns is not simple because of the existence and the mag-
nitude of R&D spillovers. Therefore, the government agencies cannot easily
distinguish ex-ante the ﬁrms that would undertake the research without the
public subsidies and those that would not.
The presence and magnitude of the "crowding-out" on R&D expenditures
after public support can help to signal this distinction ex-post. By investi-
gating the extent to which Eureka subsidies aﬀect ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures,
we attempt in the article to explore ex-post the ability of Eureka agencies
to select the ﬁrms that will beneﬁt the most from subsidies. Their ability to
do this aﬀects the eﬀciency of the programme as well as its impact on the
ﬁrms’ performance and the diﬀusion of R&D spillovers in the economy.
4 Data description and empirical methodology
4.1 Data description
Our database comes from the merger of the Eureka database and Amadeus.
The Eureka database (1998-2005) includes the name and identiﬁcation (SIREN)
code of all the Eureka research partners and some ﬁrms in termination cases.9
The set of ﬁrms in termination cases that we worked with is a sample of the
population of ﬁrms in termination cases. The whole population is not avail-
able because the Eureka agencies do not systematically keep the request form
when a subsidy request is ruled out.
Amadeus is a pan-European database (1997-2006) 10 of the annual ac-
counts of EU public and private ﬁrms. For several European countries
Amadeus is a survey, but in France it is a census that includes key vari-
ables such as the value added, exports and R&D expenditures.
We used the SIREN code to merge the Eureka database with Amadeus.
The resulting database includes 226 Eureka ﬁrms; employment is available
9The Eureka database was provided by the Eureka secretariat in Brussels.
10We used the version of Amadeus covering 1997 to 2006.
10for 169 of them. Value added is deﬂated by the price index of EU Klems.
The capital is annually deﬂated by the price index of the gross formation of
ﬁxed capital from INSEE. The GDP of the French departments comes from
Eurostat.
A distinction is made between the R&D expenditures on the balance
sheet of the ﬁrms and the R&D expenditures on the income statement. Our
database includes the intangible ﬁxed assets (proxy for the R&D expendi-
tures of the balance sheet) but we have no data on the R&D expenditures on
the income statement. Those expenditures are accounted for in the income
statement because they do not generate value (knowledge). They then aﬀect
the proﬁt and loss of the ﬁrm. The R&D expenditures creating value which




Our control group is a group of ﬁrms with the same characteristics as the
Eureka ﬁrms at the beginning of the Eureka programme, which did not
get subsidies. This control group was generated by one-to-one propensity
score matching. Speciﬁc requirements on the matched ﬁrms’ location and
industry were added to increase the validity of the matching procedure. The
matching picks up the counterfactuals in the same NUTS 3 regions11 (called
departments in France) as the Eureka ﬁrms and in the same NACE two-digit
industries. Firms in NACE four-digit industries were excluded so as not to
capture R&D spillovers which might beneﬁt ﬁrms selling similar goods or
services as the Eureka ﬁrms.
By picking matched ﬁrms in similar industries located in the same de-
partment as the subsidised ﬁrm, we attempted to assess the endogeneity
issue linked to national subsidies. This endogeneity comes from the fact
that it is the French government that chooses the French Eureka ﬁrms in
speciﬁc industries located in selected high density and backward areas. 12
Propensity score matching without additional requirements cannot correct
this kind of endogeneity. In that case, the method only corrects the endo-
geneity associated with the previous R&D activities of the subsidised ﬁrms
11The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) in Europe is available
on the EUROSTAT website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts.
12Here, we assume that all matched ﬁrms know about the programme since they are
located in Eureka departments.
11(see the balancing assumption that we present below).13
To build the matched control group, one-to-one nearest neighbour match-
ing with the Mahalonabis distance was performed without replacement. The
87 subsidised ﬁrms and the 87 matched ﬁrms of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(DD) analysis are on the common support region where the propensity score
distribution of the Eureka group and the control group overlap (Heckman
et al., 1997). We assume that the conditional independence assumption of
matching is satisﬁed. This means that we assume that we have taken ac-
count of all the ﬁrms’ characteristics that determine the treatment (i.e. the
allocation of the Eureka subsidies). This in turn implies that the treatment
is the only factor aﬀecting the outcome gap between the treated ﬁrms and
their matched counterfactuals (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
The quality of the propensity score matching relies on the balancing
assumption, according to which the matching procedure balances the distri-
bution of the ﬁrms’ characteristics aﬀecting the treatment in the Eureka and
matched ﬁrm groups. It means that the characteristics of the treated and
untreated ﬁrms are the same during the pre-treatment period.
Given that the balancing tests used in the literature can yield diﬀerent
conclusions about the balancing ability of matching (Smith & Todd, 2005),
we used two types of tests. We ﬁrst performed univariate t-tests of the
diﬀerence in means for each of the seven variables used in the matching
(i.e. the seven ﬁrm characteristics). Next, we performed the multivariate
Hotelling T2 test, comparing the means of all the variables simultaneously.
Table 2 shows that the matching was close. The univariate t-tests show that,
for each of the seven variables, the means were similar in the treated and
matched groups during the pre-treatment year. The Hotelling T2 test does
not suggest any imbalance neither. The assumption that the two vectors of
seven means are equal is not rejected.
[Table 2 about here]
Since the subsidy and pre-subsidy periods are not the same for all Eu-
reka ﬁrms, we estimated the propensity score for each pre-treatment period.
Following Arnold and Javorcik (2009), we applied our matching procedure
year by year. In addition, we computed TFP estimates by NACE three-digit
industries using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.14 We used the
13The endogeneity associated with the previous R&D activities is corrected since the
Eureka ﬁrms and the matched ﬁrms have the same R&D expenditures before the subsidies.
14The semi-parametric approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) corrects the simul-
taneity bias in the production function estimation linked to input choices (VanBeveren,
2007).
12value-added TFP version instead of the sales TFP version because it ﬁts our
topic on R&D better.
4.2.2 Firm heterogeneity
The literature on trade points out that ﬁrm heterogeneity is a key issue in
the understanding of the ﬁrms’ performance and structure. Starting from
this literature, we believe that R&D subsidies may not have the same eﬀect
on the productivity of heterogeneous ﬁrms. Following the theory presented
above, we expect them to have a greater eﬀect on less eﬃcient ﬁrms than on
more eﬃcient ones. This can be linked to knowledge ﬂows between partners
within a joint research project, and to what the innovation literature calls
the complexity of an R&D project.15 More precisely, less eﬃcient ﬁrms
have more space for innovation. Being far from the technological frontier,
their projects are less advanced. They can also take advantage of the R&D
spillovers generated by their research partners, as suggested by Cassiman
and Veugelers (2002).
To test whether the impact of R&D subsidies diﬀers across heteroge-
neous ﬁrms, we compute the initial distance-to-the-frontier-ﬁrm where the
frontier ﬁrm of the NACE four-digit industry j is the ﬁrm with the highest
TFP. TFPij is the exponential of tfpij used in DD models (Konings & Van-
denbussche, 2008). The initial distance-to-the-frontier-ﬁrm for the ﬁrm i is
deﬁned as the TFP of the ﬁrm i16 divided by the TFP of the frontier ﬁrm of





A distance of 1 means that the ﬁrm i is the frontier ﬁrm in the NACE
four-digit industry. The closer to zero the distance is, the less eﬃcient the
ﬁrm is compared to the frontier ﬁrm. The distance-to-the-frontier index
is estimated using all the ﬁrms in the Amadeus database belonging to the
Eureka industries (i.e. out of sample). This normalised distance is computed
before the Eureka subsidies came into play in year T.
15See Reinganum (1989) for a survey of the literature on models linking the probability
of innovation and R&D complexity.
16The ﬁrm i is both the Eureka ﬁrm and the matched ﬁrm.
134.2.3 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
Using the DD technique, we investigated the way in which two sets of similar
ﬁrms developed after one set received public subsidies to invest and collabo-
rate in R&D and the other set did not. Our DD speciﬁcations estimate the
gap in TFP and labour productivity. Speciﬁcations are also performed on
other outcomes such as R&D expenditures, capital and employment. The
DD equation for TFP with ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects is the following:
tfpit = α+β1SUBSit+β2AFTSUBSit+β3Y EAR−DUMMIESt+γi+￿it
(7)
A dummy variable, SUBS, was created to identify the years when the
ﬁrm got public support through the Eureka programme. The dummy vari-
able takes the value 1 in the years of the subsidy and 0 in the years before
and after the subsidy for the Eureka ﬁrm. The dummy always takes the
value 0 for the ﬁrms in the control group. Since R&D expenditures are
sunk costs that need time to bear fruit, we expected to ﬁnd a delay be-
tween the investment of the public subsidy in collaborative R&D and any
eﬀect on productivity. The AFTSUBS variable captures this delayed eﬀect.
AFTSUBS takes the value 1 in the years after the R&D subsidy and 0 in
the years before and during the subsidy for the Eureka ﬁrm. It is always 0 for
the matched ﬁrms. SUBS and AFTSUBS are key variables in the DD spec-
iﬁcations. We believe that they can identify the causal relationship between
the subsidies for the collaborative R&D and productivity (i.e. they estimate
the change in productivity due to the subsidies). Firm ﬁxed eﬀects were
included in the DD speciﬁcations on the panel data because time-invariant
ﬁrm characteristics (such as the industry and the department) matter. In
addition, we controlled for the Order 1 autoregressive process (AR(1)) of
the error terms. This process can inﬂuence the results because the increas-
ing or decreasing trend of the ﬁrm’s productivity may explain the diﬀerence
in outcome between the treated ﬁrms and the matched counterfactuals.
5 Attracting R&D subsidies
5.1 Geographical pattern and summary statistics
An analysis of the characteristics of the Eureka ﬁrms is useful to learn more
about the rules of the Eureka subsidies. A map, concentration indexes and
some descriptive statistics are presented in ﬁgure 5 and tables 3−4. Concen-
tration indexes are used in geographical economics and in industrial organ-
14isation to study the concentration of an industry. Here, we assume that all
Eureka ﬁrms belong to the Eureka "industry" whose concentration is under
scrutiny. To study the Eureka geographical pattern, we built a map showing
the location quotients in 2006. France consists of 94 departments. The map
(Figure 5) shows clearly that the French Eureka ﬁrms are located in high
density and backward areas.
[Figure 5 about here]
The Eureka location quotient is above 1 in 32% of the departments
and ﬁve areas of concentration emerge: Ile-de-France, the North-East (Al-
sace, Meurthe-et-Moselle), the South-East (Ain, Isère, Alpes Maritime), the
North-West (Finistère, Mayenne) and the Central South-West (Indre, Puy-
de-Dôme, Landes). More precisely, the Eureka ﬁrms are mainly concentrated
in Puy-de-Dôme, Hauts-de-Seine, Yvelines, Charente and Creuse. The loca-
tion quotient for each of these departments is over 3.
The density of concentration areas is mixed.17 Some of the Eureka ﬁrms
are located in the high-density areas of Ile-de-France and Alpes-Maritimes,
but others are found in backward areas, in particular in the Central South-
West. This concentration in backward areas seems to be linked to the Eureka
rules. Indeed, the concentration in those areas suggests that the French
R&D subsidy policy aims at improving the competitiveness of regions with
low density.
We also built plant-based and employment-based concentration indexes
(ˆ γMS and ˆ γEG) for 2006. The ﬁrst index was proposed by Maurel and
Sedillot (1999), and the second by Ellison and Glaeser (1997). The indexes
for the Eureka ﬁrms (table 3) show that the locations of any two Eureka ﬁrms
are positively correlated. Tests on the variance of the concentration indexes
show that they are signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level (Maurel & Sedillot,
1999). However given the magnitude of the indexes, this correlation is weak.
Moreover, the diﬀerence between the estimators is large. The plant-based
estimator ˆ γMS is four times greater than the employment-based estimator
ˆ γEG. Such facts show that the French Eureka plants are heterogeneous in
terms of employment (Lafourcade & Mion, 2007).
[Table 3 about here]
17For the department density, we use the GDP per capita of the departments, which is
available on the Eurostat website:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home.
15Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the period 1998 − 2005. The
ﬁrst column concerns all French ﬁrms in similar NACE four-digit industries
to the Eureka ﬁrms, and located in the Eureka departments. The last two
columns concern the Eureka ﬁrms and the ﬁrms in termination cases. We see
that the Eureka ﬁrms are on average large ﬁrms, with a high level of value
added. The magnitude of the standard errors for employment conﬁrms that
the Eureka ﬁrms are not homogeneous in terms of employment (as shown
in table 3). Moreover, the Eureka ﬁrms and the ﬁrms in termination cases
are, on average, located in areas with a lower GDP than other ﬁrms. The
ﬁrms in termination cases usually are large ﬁrms with a lower level of value
added than the Eureka ﬁrms. This fact is linked to the selection procedure
for subsidising ﬁrms: ﬁrms in decline are not supported.
[Table 4 about here]
5.2 Probability of attracting Eureka R&D subsidies
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of logit models on ﬁrms’ probability of
attracting Eureka subsidies, and hence the characteristics of the ﬁrms getting
the subsidies. The propensity score for matching is derived from these models
and allowed us to select the matched control group. Here, we compare the
Eureka ﬁrms with the ﬁrms in close NACE four-digit industries located in
the same departments during the pre-treatment period. We also compare
the Eureka ﬁrms with the ﬁrms in termination cases. For the Eureka ﬁrms,
the binary outcome of the logit model is worth 1 in the ﬁrst year of the
subsidy and 0 in the years before the subsidy. Data on subsidised ﬁrms
is dropped after the ﬁrst year of the subsidy because having a dependent
variable equal to 0 means that the ﬁrm has never been subsidised. The
outcome is always 0 for unsubsidised ﬁrms. The covariates are lagged by a
year so that we can focus on the pre-treatment year. During the selection
process, the R&D proposal and ﬁnancial health of ﬁrms requesting Eureka
subsidies are scrutinised. As the selection of Eureka ﬁrms can be endogenous
with their R&D expenditures, it is likely that the better a ﬁrm knows the
market and performs in it, the better its R&D proposal will be.
In selecting ﬁrms for subsidies it is likely that the Eureka agencies look at
size (employment) and performance indicators such as longevity (i.e. age, a
proxy for ﬁrm’s experience), productivity (seen as a measure of technology),
the growth rate of capital investment (a proxy for the ﬁrm’s growth trend),
credit constraints (loans on sales) and the ﬁrm’s ability to sell products
beyond the borders of the domestic market. Employment can also be seen
16as a proxy of the ﬁrm’s lobbying skills. Large ﬁrms in France are more
likely than smaller ﬁrms to be able to put the authorities under pressure for
subsidies.
We evaluated binomial logit models. Another way to proceed would have
been to perform a multinomial logit. However this is not meaningful given
the size of the control group of ﬁrms in termination cases relative to the size
of the group of ﬁrms in closed industries.
The logit speciﬁcations include sector and department dummies because
it is expected that industries and locations aﬀect the selection of the subsi-
dized ﬁrms. First, the map (ﬁgure 5) on the concentration of the Eureka ﬁrms
suggests that the geographical location of subsidised ﬁrms is not random.18
The location is driven by forces related to the rules of the programme. As
the Eureka programme in France is supported by the French authorities, we
expect the R&D subsidies to be part of a policy helping relatively good ﬁrms
to grow by improving their technology. Due to regional European policy, it is
also likely that the Eureka agencies get incentives to subsidise ﬁrms located
in areas of low economic activity, and this is conﬁrmed on the map. Next,
it is likely that ﬁrms of some speciﬁc industries have a higher probability to
get R&D subisidies than ﬁrms operating in other industries.
In Table 5, the results of the logit models for the Eureka ﬁrms and ﬁrms
that did not request the Eureka subsidies show that older ﬁrms and those
with a larger number of employees are more likely to be subsidised. Firms
with a high TFP also have a greater probability of receiving subsidies. The
TFP variable is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In addition, a higher exports-to-
sales ratio results in greater attractiveness to the Eureka agencies. A positive
growth in capital also increases the probability of receiving subsidies (see
column 4).
[Table 5 about here]
The sector and department dummies are omitted from the model de-
scribed in column 1 of table 5. The introduction of department dummies
changes the positive and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of TFP to a positive and
signiﬁcant one in column 2. This shows that the Eureka ﬁrms are productive
ﬁrms in less productive departments. Column 3 with industry dummies and
no department dummies gives results similar to the ﬁrst model.
The results in table 6 show that, before the subsidies, the Eureka ﬁrms
had a better productivity trend than ﬁrms in termination cases. The growth
18The assumption that the location of Eureka ﬁrms is random (as far as the location of
ﬁrms can be random (see Ellison and Glaeser (1997)) is rejected.
17in TFP is always positive (around 0.17) and signiﬁcant. During the pre-
subsidy year, ﬁrms in termination cases are similar to the Eureka ﬁrms except
for their growth in TFP and exports-to sales ratios. When the sector and
department dummies were excluded, growth in TFP and the exports-to-sales
ratios were both positive and signiﬁcant (column 1). With sector dummies
or department dummies, the exports-to-sales ratio becomes negative and
insigniﬁcant (columns 2 and 3). This indicates that the Eureka ﬁrms are
located in departments and industries that exported more than the ﬁrms
in termination cases. The exports-to-sales ratio become insigniﬁcant when
both the sectors and the departments are controlled (column 4). Therefore,
table 6 suggests that the Eureka ﬁrms were on a faster growth track than the
ﬁrms in termination cases. In addition, the descriptive statistics in table 4
concerning data on the whole time-span shows that the ﬁrms in termination
cases were unable to improve their value added. This reﬂects the Eureka
rule of supporting ﬁrms with a potential for growth. Given this fact, we will
not provide DD results for the ﬁrms in termination cases.
[Table 6 about here]
6 Results: evaluating the eﬀects of the R&D sub-
sidies
We performed DD speciﬁcations on various outcomes such as employment,
capital, and loans on sales to investigate the extent to which the structure of
the Eureka ﬁrms diﬀered before and after the subsidies. We also assessed the
issue of the potential "crowding-out" of R&D activities. The origin of this
eﬀect can be crucial for the causal relationship between the Eureka subsidies
and ﬁrm productivity. Here the "crowding-out eﬀect" was estimated through
equations on intangible ﬁxed assets (as a proxy for R&D expenditures).
To study the relationship between the subsidies and ﬁrm productivity, we
performed DD analysis on TFP and labour productivity (taken as the log
of the value added per worker). Moreover, we allowed ﬁrm heterogeneity.
After matching, we corrected for the AR(1) process of error terms in the DD
speciﬁcations. In doing so, we wanted to ensure that the outcome varies due
to the R&D subsidies rather than due to the growing or decreasing trend
of Eureka ﬁrms. In previous papers on the evaluation of R&D subsidies
using the DD approach (whether or not combined with matching), the serial
correlation of error terms was not tested.19
19We are able to test autocorrelation since we have panel data.
186.1 Restructuring and eﬀect on the private R&D expendi-
ture
The ﬁrst outcomes of interest are employment, capital, R&D expenditures,
average wage20 and loans normalised by sales (the proxy for the ﬁrm’s credit
constraints). In tables 7 and 8, the only signiﬁcant variables are for the
growth in the log of the average wage. Both SUBS and AFTSUBS variables
are negative and signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding shows that from the beginning of
the R&D subsidies, the Eureka ﬁrms have a disadvantage of around 18.5%
in terms of growth in average wage. This suggests that the matched ﬁrms
upgrade their skills more quickly than the subsidised ﬁrms. There is no
evidence for a link between the Eureka subsidies and employment, capital,
R&D expenditures or credit constraints. In other words, we did not ﬁnd any
evidence of restructuring.
[Table 7 about here]
[Table 8 about here]
A particular feature of the analysis is that the subsidised ﬁrms did not
seem to invest more in R&D. Correcting for the ﬁrst order autocorrelation,
the R&D expenditures were the same for the subsidised and the matched
ﬁrms. This might indicate that the public subsidies "crowded out" private
R&D expenditures, i.e. they are substitutes. Alternatively it might mean
that the R&D subsidies are not used to increase the R&D expenditures shown
on the balance sheet (i.e. the expenditures on research whose outcome is an
asset for the ﬁrm). The subsidies might be used instead to increase the R&D
expenditures accounted for in the income statement (i.e. the expenditures on
research whose outcome is not an asset for the ﬁrm). Due to data limitations,
we could not observe this latter type of R&D expenditures.
6.2 R&D subsidies and productivity
The second outcomes of interest are TFP and labour productivity. The DD
equations between the Eureka ﬁrms and the matched ﬁrms show that the
coeﬃcient of the AFTSUBS variable is positive and signiﬁcant (column 1
of table 9). The average Eureka ﬁrm experiences a gain in TFP of 15.6%
relative to its matched counterfactual. This DD result shows that the dif-
ference between the TFP at the beginning and end of the subsidies (i.e. the
logarithmic growth rate of TFP) is bigger for the average Eureka ﬁrm than
20The average wage is deﬁned as the ﬁrm’s total wage divided by employment.
19for its counterfactual. Since the two ﬁrms had similar TFPs at the beginning
of the subsidies,21 the average Eureka ﬁrm must have a bigger TFP after the
subsidies.
The coeﬃcient of the AFTSUBS variable is not signiﬁcant in the triple
diﬀerence speciﬁcations, i.e. speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is
the variation in TFP (column 2). These results suggest the improvement in
TFP of the average Eureka ﬁrm occurs in jumps rather than continuously.
On the other hand, the results show little evidence of a subsidy eﬀect on
labour productivity for the average Eureka ﬁrm (columns 4 and 5).
[Table 9 about here]
6.3 Firm heterogeneity
To allow for ﬁrm heterogeneity we computed the initial distance-to-the-
frontier-ﬁrm (dtf) of the ﬁrms. The 87 Eureka ﬁrms have scores between
0 and 1. Some 48 Eureka ﬁrms had an initial distance below 0.32, 63 had
a distance below 0.5 and 5 had a distance of 1. The large fraction of low
TFP Eureka ﬁrms can be linked to the collaborative nature of the Eureka
subsidies. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) show that less productive ﬁrms
have a higher propensity to collaborate in order to capture information ﬂows
coming from their research partners. In addition, the average initial distance
of the Eureka ﬁrms was 0.32, with a standard deviation of 0.31. This means
that the frontier ﬁrm (the most eﬃcient ﬁrm, subsidised or not) in a Eureka
NACE four-digit industry was three times more productive than the average
Eureka ﬁrm.
Controlling for ﬁrm heterogeneity in column 3 of table 9 shows that
the AFTSUBS variable still positive (0.35) and becomes more signiﬁcant
while the interaction between AFTSUBS and the initial distance is nega-
tive (−0.61) and signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrm heterogeneity
matters i.e. the overall delayed eﬀect of the subsidies depends on the initial
productivity. For the average Eureka ﬁrm, the overall impact of the subsidies
on its TFP is 15.6% after four yearsa. All 72 Eureka ﬁrms with an initial
distance below than 0.57 show an improvement in their TFP. The least eﬃ-
cient ﬁrm in a Eureka NACE four-digit industry (zero initial distance) has
an improvement in TFP of 35% relative to its counterfactual. The most
eﬃcient one has a disadvantage of 26.% relative to its matched ﬁrm. We
ﬁnd little evidence of the subsidy eﬀect on labour productivity for the aver-
21See table 4 on the balancing assumption.
20age Eureka ﬁrm (columns 4 and 5). However, column 6, which includes the
initial distance, shows that ﬁrm heterogeneity is a key point to this outcome.
The heterogeneous impact of the Eureka R&D subsidies on ﬁrms is a
striking feature. It can be associated with R&D spillovers. It might be
that the further the Eureka ﬁrm is from the frontier, the larger are the
spillovers. More precisely, it is not likely that the "assortative matching"
is so strong that the "very laggard ﬁrms" only collaborate with other "very
laggard ﬁrms", while the ﬁrms at the frontier collaborate only with other
ﬁrms at the frontier. On average, the likelihood that a "very laggard ﬁrm"
collaborates with a ﬁrm closer to the frontier is higher than the likelihood
that this ﬁrm collaborates with another "very laggard ﬁrm". Hence, it might
be that a Eureka ﬁrm at the frontier experiences lower productivity gains
than its matched ﬁrm, since it spends time explaining how to innovate to its
research partners.
As the Eureka R&D subsidies are not proportional to the ﬁrms’ size,
it may be that the heterogeneous Eureka impact is also linked to size of
the highly productive ﬁrms. Given that the Eureka ﬁrms the closest to the
frontier are large ﬁrms,22 it is possible that those ﬁrms do not get an R&D
subsidies large enough to allow them to innovate, while small or medium-
sized ﬁrms located at the same small initial distance could innovate with the
same level of subsidy. Therefore, those highly productive are characterised
by their size and the tougher innovation they face being close to the frontier.
In the following part on the robustness checks, the link between productivity
and initial size is investigated.
Furthermore, the lower gains in productivity of the frontier Eureka ﬁrms
(relative to their matched ﬁrms) can come from the fact that they take more
time to innovate. It is possible that research conducted by a frontier ﬁrm
within a Eureka joint venture is part of a long-run R&D project whose the
eﬀect on productivity will appear later on.23 For strategic reasons, only part
of this project is shared with the Eureka partners.
Finally, it is possible that the highly productive ﬁrms in the control
group became more productive because they conducted R&D mainly aimed
at decreasing their marginal costs, whereas the highly productive Eureka
ﬁrms conducted R&D to increase the variety of their products on the market.
22The seven Eureka ﬁrms closest to the frontier had more than 40 employees at the
beginning of the subsidies.
23We estimate the impact of the R&D subsidies on a period up to four years after the
Eureka research. Beyond those four years, it is more complicated to assess a causal impact
of the subsidies.
216.4 Robustness checks
As a ﬁrst robustness check, the heterogeneous impact of the Eureka subsidies
on other outcomes was tested in Table 10. In particular, column 2 shows such
a impact on capital. The coeﬃcient of the SUBS variable is negative and
signiﬁcant while its interaction with the initial distance from the technology
frontier is positive. This shows that, on average, the Eureka ﬁrms invested
less in capital during the subsidised period than the matched ﬁrms.
Interestingly, the positive coeﬃcient of the interaction term shows that
the highly productive ﬁrms invested more in capital than their matched ﬁrms.
If their increase in capital is due to an increase in R&D capital, the result
suggests the highly productive ﬁrms involved in research joint venture face
more diﬃculties or take more time to innovate than their matched ﬁrms.
On the other side, there is little evidence of a heterogeneous impact on
employment, R&D expenditures, average wage, or credit constraints.
[Table 10 about here]
Next for the second robustness check, we turn to the average impact of
the Eureka subsidies on diﬀerent periods. Column 1 of table 11 indicates a
gain in TFP of 16.5% one year after the Eureka subsidies,24 a gain of 16.4%
after two years and a gain of 16.3% after three years. The gain of 15.6%
obtained in column 1 of table 9 comes out after 4 years. Those results lend
support to our empirical analysis.
[Table 11 about here]
Our third robustness check examines the relationship between TFP and
the initial size of the ﬁrm. The results in column 2 of table 11 suggest that
the eﬀect of the subsidies on TFP does not diﬀer according to ﬁrm size
since the interaction between the AFTSUBS variable and the initial size is
insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless as mentioned in the previous section, there are no
small or medium Eureka ﬁrms close to the technology frontier in the sample.
Therefore, the possibility that the highly productive Eureka ﬁrms do not get
enough subsidies relative to their size cannot be excluded.
Finally in column 3 of table 11 we test spatial autocorrelation in the
sense that productivity shocks of one ﬁrm in a department can aﬀect the
productivity of the ﬁrms located in the same department. The results con-
trolling for spatial autocorrelation prove to be similar to the previous results
24The large magnitude of the gain in TFP can be attributed to the fact that we use the
added value version of the TFP fucntion instead of the sales version.
22on ﬁrm heterogeneity (column 3 of table 9). They then show that spatial
autocorrelation does not matter in our case.
7 Discussion: gain in productivity and eﬀect on pri-
vate R&D expenditures
An important result in our empirical analysis that needs more discussion is
the fact that we observe an increase in average TFP for Eureka ﬁrms, even
if their R&D expenditures are similar to those of the control group. Two
explanations can be provided. The ﬁrst is that our data only considers ex-
penditures from the balance sheet. It could be however the subsidies received
by Eureka ﬁrms are accounted in their income statement, which we do not
have access to. The second is due to spillover eﬀect, where by collaborating
with others ﬁrms, Eureka ﬁrms increase their productivity more than the
control group.
Another point to discuss is the "crowding-out" of R&D expenditures.
The results show that during the subsidized period, the Eureka ﬁrms and
the control group that do not get R&D subsidies have similar R&D expen-
ditures. This fact show that the Eureka ﬁrms decrease their private R&D
expenditures and suggests that those private expenditures are "crowded out"
by the subsidies. In the case where the "crowding-out eﬀect" is associated
with opportunism, the increase in average TFP cannot be attributed to the
Eureka subsidies because the subsidized ﬁrms are ﬁrms able to conduct R&D
and increase productivity without subsidies. In other words, a "crowding-out
eﬀect" related to opportunism shows that the Eureka agencies fail to select
the proposals that will not be pursued otherwise. This aﬀects the eﬃciency
of the Eureka program.
Nevertheless, a "crowding-out" of private R&D expenditures can have
several other explanations. First, it can be related to the sharing of R&D
expenditures between the Eureka ﬁrms. The collaboration in R&D deletes
the duplication and overlaps (Katz, 1986). The Eureka ﬁrms then decrease
their R&D private expenditures. Second, the "crowding-out" can also show
that the subsidized ﬁrms delay the ﬁnancing of their own R&D to the period
after the subsidies. The subsidies thus ensure them to conduct research also
beyond the subsidized years (Wallsten, 2000). Third, it is also possible that
a good selection of the Eureka ﬁrms explains the results. The matched ﬁrms
ﬁnd the support of other investors and undertake R&D projects. This means
that the Eureka agencies have a proper ability of choosing the R&D proposals
that will not be undertaken without the governmental subsidies. Finally, as
23mentioned above data only includes the R&D expenditures accounted in
the balance sheet. It can be therefore that the R&D expenditures from
the income statement are higher for the Eureka ﬁrms although their R&D
expenditures from the balance sheet are similar to the control group.
Due to lack of data, we can neither study the relationship between the
R&D subsidies and R&D expenditures from the income statement nor to
test the sharing assumption and the assumption following which the Eureka
ﬁrms keep private funds during the subsidies to be able to ﬁnance their
private R&D afterwards. Consequently, we cannot exclude that there is a
"crowding-out eﬀect" associated with opportunism. In order to shrink this
kind of eﬀect, the Eureka programme could be more protected against moral
hazard by a strengthening of monitoring.
Beside a lack of data mentioned above, our study has three major limi-
tations. First, we do not investigate the impact of the Eureka program on
R&D spillovers and social welfare. Second, we do not know if the Eureka
ﬁrms and the ﬁrms in the control group get other kinds of subsidies. Third,
as Lerner (1999), our single program analysis does not allow us to compare
the Eureka program with other R&D subsidies programmes based on diﬀer-
ent rules. Concerning the eﬀect of Eureka program in Europe, our interest
for a single European country does not allow to study the diﬀerence between
countries and therefore restricts the discussion on the European geographical
disparities associated with the Eureka programme.
8 Concluding remarks
Governments set up R&D programmes to increase the knowledge creation of
ﬁrms, competing in an evermore integrated and global economic framework.
This paper endeavors to deepen our understanding of R&D subsidies on ﬁrm
productivity. Previous literature have mainly investigated the average eﬀect
of R&D subsidy on ﬁrm performance. However, the impact of subsidies on
heterogeneous ﬁrms has never been investigated. In particular, as pointed
out by the trade literature, ﬁrm heterogeneity can be crucial to understand
the performance of ﬁrms. The main contribution of this paper is thus to
propose both a theoretical and empirical model to analyst the impact of
R&D subsidies on heterogeneous ﬁrms and namely their productivity.
The theoretical model provides an answer as to how an R&D subsidy
makes a ﬁrm develops a new technology faster. The model is an extension
to the model of the Miyagiwa and Ohno model (1995) and shows that a ﬁrm
24getting a subsidy for collaborative R&D speeds up the technology adoption
and becomes more productive. The earlier adoption is associated with R&D
spillovers and a decrease in the innovation cost. It is also found that ﬁrm
heterogeneity matters. The model shows that a subsidized ﬁrm adopts the
new technology faster if it is lowly productive than if it were highly produc-
tive. Being located far from the technology frontier, a lowly productive ﬁrm
can more easily innovate than a highly productive ﬁrm.
This paper also provides an empirical analysis to examine the impact of
the European Eureka program of public R&D subsidies on ﬁrm performance,
which corroborates the theory. More important, the empirical model exam-
ines how R&D subsidies aﬀect the performance of heterogeneous ﬁrms. We
use a unique database on the French Eureka ﬁrms. Other ﬁrm data such
as added value, exports and R&D expenditures were obtained using the
Amadeus database on the ﬁrms’ balance sheets. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
technique is used to assess the role of R&D subsidies on productivity and
other ﬁrm performance measures like employment and capital. The potential
"crowding-out" of private R&D expenditures is also investigated. This eﬀect
is crucial to assess the causal relationship between the subsidies and produc-
tivity. The results suggest that, on average, the TFP of the subsidized ﬁrms
is higher of around 15% towards the end of the 4-year subsidy period relative
to the matched control group. The empirical results also suggest that the
subsidized ﬁrms raise less their wages in comparison to the matched control
ﬁrms. There is little evidence about a role of R&D subsidies on employment,
capital, R&D expenditures and credit constraints.
Controlling for ﬁrm heterogeneity, we see that the R&D subsidy policy
creates productivity gains for the less eﬃcient subsidized ﬁrms. Those ﬁrms
become more productive than their matched ﬁrm in terms of both labour
productivity and TFP. It is not the case for the most eﬃcient ﬁrms that
become less productive than their matched ﬁrm.
This paper shows that ﬁrm heterogeneity brings new insight on the eﬀects
of R&D subsidies on ﬁrm-level productivity. Indeed, the results suggest that
investigating the average eﬀect of R&D subsidies on ﬁrm performance is not
suﬃcient, and studying ﬁrm heterogeneity is important. It is likely that ﬁrm
heterogeneity will attract more and more attention in the future research on
public expenditures.
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Figure 1: Optimal adoption date and R&D collaboration
t∗
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Figure 2: Optimal adoption date and R&D subsidy
t∗
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Figure 4: Firm heterogeneity, optimal adoption date and R&D subsidy
t∗
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Map and location quotients:
The location quotient Qe,l of the Eureka ﬁrms located in the French




29where ne,l is the number of Eureka ﬁrms located in department l; ne is
the total number of Eureka ﬁrms in France; nl is the number of ﬁrms in
department l; and N is the total number of French ﬁrms.
Figure 5: Concentration of Eureka ﬁrms in 2006




15 Food Products and Beverages 13
17 Textiles 3
18 Wearing Apparel 1
20 Manufacture of Wood 3
21 Manufacture of Paper Products 1
22 Publishing and Printing 2
24 Chemicals 12
25 Rubber and Plastic Products 5
26 Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 1
27 Basic Metals 4
28 Fabricated Metal Products except Machinery and Equipment 7
29 Machinery and Equipment 17
30 Oﬃce Machinery and Computers 2
31 Electric Machinery and Apparatus 4
32 Radio, Television and Communication Equipment 14
33 Medical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 18
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 3
35 Other Transport Equipment 10
36 Furniture 1
40 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Hot Water Supply 1
45 Construction 4
50 Sale and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 2
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade 4
52 Retail Trade except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 2
63 Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities 1
64 Post and Telecommunications 1
67 Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation 1
72 Computer and Related Activities 25
73 Research and Development 17
74 Other Business Activities 26
‡ N is the number of Eureka ﬁrms.
31Table 2: Balancing tests
Matched ﬁrms Eureka ﬁrms
Test in means diﬀerence Mean Mean T-test P-value
Aget−1 34.07 30.40 0.8963 0.3714
ln(Employment)t−1 5.16 5.08 0.2525 0.8010
TFPt−1 4.64 4.56 0.4915 0.6237
∆TFP 0.02 0.03 -0.1353 0.8925
ln(Exports/Sales)t−1 0.23 0.23 -0.1718 0.8638
ln(Loans/Sales)t−1 0.01 0.01 -0.1416 0.8876
∆Capital 0.14 1.16 -1.005 0.3177
N 87 87
T2 F-stat P-value
Hotelling test 2.3080 0.3182 0.9450
Balancing assumption:
To test the balancing assumption, we ﬁrst perform univariate t-tests of
diﬀerence in means between the Eureka ﬁrms sample and the matched sam-
ple. Those tests show whether the mean of each variable used in matching is
the same in both samples. Next, we use the multivariate Hotelling T2 test,
more eﬃcient than the ﬁrst ones. The latter test compares simultaneously
the equality in the mean of the variables. In particular, the Hotelling T2
test we implement is a t-test of joint equality of the two vectors of means.
The vector of means ∈ R7×1. Each row of the vector corresponds to a ﬁrm
characteristic included in the matching approach.
Table 3: Concentration indexes of Eu-
reka ﬁrms‡
2006
ˆ γMS ˆ γEG
Value 0.0227 0.0044
Standard Deviation 0.0007 0.0009
Number of plants 522,592 522,592
Number of industries 2 2
Number of spatial units 94 94
‡ ˆ γMS is the plant-based index and ˆ γEG is
the employment-based index. The spatial
unit is the department.
32Table 4: Summary statistics of key variables for the time-span (1998 − 2005)‡
Other Firms Eureka Firms Firms in T.C.
Variable N Mean Std Dev. N Mean Std Dev. N Mean Std Dev.
Employment 419,675 44 607 924 1,988 9,347 264 1,326 3,829
Value Added 419,675 2,432 36,792 924 178,958 1,128,493 264 12,916 71,912
Exports 684,375 92,448 2,088,387 1,007 8,968,334 3.32e+07 207 9,996,195 5.37e+07
Department GDP 419,675 160,186 105,093 924 146.130 98,843 264 143,412 97,979
‡ Firms in T.C. are the ﬁrms in termination cases. Value added and department GDP are in euros. Std Dev. is the
standard deviation and N is the number of observations.
Table 5: Characteristics of ﬁrms getting the R&D subsidies: Eureka
ﬁrms versus ﬁrms in same departments and industries‡
I II III IV
Aget−1 0.002 0.007** 0.002 0.008*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln(Employment)t−1 0.715*** 0.405*** 0.710*** 0.431***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
TFPt−1 0.063 0.438** 0.048 0.406**
(0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.20)
∆ TFP 0.248 0.341 0.223 0.303
(0.18) (0.24) (0.18) (0.24)
ln(Exports/Sales)t−1 3.680*** 1.805*** 3.696*** 2.083***
(0.38) (0.52) (0.39) (0.54)
ln(Loans/Sales)t−1 0.289 0.184 0.244 0.232
(0.25) (0.45) (0.32) (0.53)
∆ Capital 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Department FE NO YES NO YES
Industry FE NO NO YES YES
Intercept -11.122*** -10.414*** -10.847*** -10.631***
(0.50) (0.89) (0.99) (1.25)
R2 0.197 0.321 0.215 0.351
N 326,404 235,550 266,085 192,652
‡ Table reports the regressions results of the Logit models where the control
group comprises the ﬁrms in the Eureka departments operating in the 4 digit
NACE industries close to the Eureka ones. FE stands for ﬁxed eﬀects. Stan-
dard Errors reported between brackets. Signiﬁcance level: *p-value<0.10, **
p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
33Table 6: Characteristics of ﬁrms getting the R&D subsidies: Eureka ﬁrms
versus ﬁrms in termination Cases‡
I II III IV
Aget−1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln(Employment)t−1 -0.023 -0.064 -0.010 -0.064
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
TFPt−1 -0.011 0.071 -0.039 0.104
(0.06) (0.15) (0.08) (0.18)
∆ TFP 0.151** 0.170** 0.151** 0.191**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
ln(Exports/Sales)t−1 0.539** 0.743 0.558 0.901*
(0.32) (0.39) (0.45) (0.55)
ln(Loans/Sales)t−1 2.564 2.207 2.487 1.993
(1.67) (1.70) (1.65) (1.74)
∆Capital -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Department FE NO YES NO YES
Industry FE NO NO YES YES
Intercept -1.671*** -0.851 -1.836*** -1.766
(0.41) (0.69) (0.49) (1.00)
R2 0.084 0.092 0.103 0.111
N 751 746 718 715
‡ Table reports the regressions results of the Logit models where the
control group comprises the ﬁrms which request the Eureka sub-
sidy but do not get it. FE stands for ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard Errors
reported between brackets. Signiﬁcance level: *p-value<0.10, **
p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
34Table 7: R&D subsidies and evidence of restructuring: employment, capital and R&D
expenditures - Eureka ﬁrms versus matched ﬁrms‡
1 2 3 4 5 6
Empl. ∆ Empl. ln(Capital) ∆ ln(Capital) ln(R&D Exp.) ∆ ln(R&D Exp.)
SUBS 0.026 0.096 -0.022 -0.012 0.220 -0.210
(0.50) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.25) (0.33)
AFTSUBS -0.010 0.037 -0.038 0.006 -0.182 -0.552
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.39) (0.46)
AR(1) coeﬀ. 0.72*** 0.39** 0.66*** 0.34*** 0.56*** 0.22***
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept -0.743*** -1.160*** 2.099*** 1.829*** -0.839 -2.643
(0.13) (0.34) (0.18) (0.20) (0.65) (1.83)
N 1011 1011 1011 1011 992 980
‡ Table summarizes the regressions results of the DD models where the control group comprises the matched
ﬁrms. FE stands for ﬁxed eﬀects. The use of the year 1997 to compute the outcome in growth rate explains
the no (little) divergence of number of observations between the outcome in level and in growth. Standard
Errors reported between brackets. Signiﬁcance level: *p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
Table 8: Evidence of restructuring?: average wage and loans on sales - Eureka ﬁrms versus matched
ﬁrms‡
1 2 3 4
ln(Av.Wage) ∆ln(Av.Wage) ln(Loans/Sales) ∆ ln(Loans/Sales)
SUBS -0.076 -0.183** 0.005 -0.001
(0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
AFTSUBS -0.009 -0.188** -0.005 -0.001
(0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 8.314*** 0.030 -0.002 -0.001
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.001)
N 1182 1180 1183 1107
‡ Table gives the regressions results of the DD models where the control group comprises the matched ﬁrms. FE
stands for ﬁxed eﬀects. The use of available data for 1997 to compute the outcome in growth rate explains the no
(little) divergence of number of observations between the outcome in level and in growth. Standard Errors reported
between brackets. Signiﬁcance level: *p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
35Table 9: R&D subsidies, productivity and ﬁrm heterogeneity - Eureka ﬁrms versus
matched ﬁrms‡
1 2 3 4 5 6
tfp ∆ tfp tfp DTF ln(Lab.Pr) ∆ln(Lab.Pr) ln(Lab.Pr) DTF
SUBS 0.013 0.003 0.088 0.023 -0.045 0.033
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
SUBS ∗ DTF -0.118 -0.021
(0.19) (0.19)
AFTSUBS 0.156* 0.050 0.350** 0.151 0.021 0.280**
(0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
AFTSUBS ∗ DTF -0.611** -0.479*
(0.30) (0.29)
Capital -0.034 -0.058 -0.036
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
AR(1) coeﬀ. 0.39* 0.18*** 0.05***
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.437** 0.101 4.547*** 4.477*** 4.020** 4.501***
(0.21) (0.06) (0.05) (0.57) (2.00) (0.56)
N 984 857 1158 1158 930 1158
‡ Table shows the regressions results of the DD models where the control group comprises the matched
ﬁrms. FE stands for ﬁxed eﬀects. DTF is the initial Distance-to-Frontier-Firm. Standard Errors re-
ported between brackets. Signiﬁcance level: *p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
Table 10: Robustness check: restructuring and ﬁrm heterogeneity - Eureka ﬁrms versus matched ﬁrms‡
1 2 3 4 5
Empl DTF ln(Capital) DTF ln(R&D Exp.) DTF ln(Av.Wage) DTF ln(Loan/Sales) DTF
SUBS 0.080 -0.174* 0.228 -0.171 0.006
(0.08) (0.10 ) (0.39) (0.15) (0.005)
SUBS ∗ DTF -0.173 0.467** 0.024 0.286 -0.002
(0.18) (0.23) (0.88) (0.27) (0.004)
AFTSUBS -0.077 -0.124 0.175 -0.016 0.001
(0.12) (0.15) (0.57) (0.10) (0.004)
AFTSUBS ∗ DTF 0.256 0.220 -1.211 -0.011 -0.021
(0.29) (0.37) (1.37) (0.20) (0.02)
AR(1) coeﬀ. 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.55***
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.732*** 2.078*** -0.821 8.316*** -0.002
(0.13) (0.18) (0.66) (0.03) (0.006)
N 1011 1011 992 1182 1183
‡ DTF is the initial Distance-to-Frontier-Firm. Standard Errors reported between brackets. FE stands for ﬁxed eﬀects. Sig-
niﬁcance level: *p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
36Table 11: Robustness check: subsidy eﬀect over time, size eﬀect and spatial
autocorrelation - Eureka Firms versus Matched Firms‡
1 2 3
tfp over time tfp INITIAL SIZE tfp spatial autocc.
1 year AFTSUBS 0.165*
(0.084)
2 years AFTSUBS 0.164*
(0.087)
3 years AFTSUBS 0.163*
(0.090)




SUBS ∗ INITIAL SIZE -2.24e-04*
(1.23e-0)




AFTSUBS ∗ INITIAL SIZE 3.76e-06
(2.32e-04)
AFTSUBS ∗ DTF -0.612*
(0.32)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes




N 1 year after 934
N 2 years after 964
N 3 years after 978
N 4 years after 984
‡ DTF is the initial Distance-to-Frontier-Firm. AR(1) process is corrected in all columns.
Standard Errors reported between brackets. FE stands for ﬁxed eﬀects. Signiﬁcance
level: *p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
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